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COMMENTS 
Inconsistent Standards of Substantive Due Process in 
Economic Regulations: A Result of the Federalist 
System of Government 
All citizens of the United States are guaranteed that they will not 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 1 
However, different interpretations exist as to how much protection the 
guarantee of due process provides. This is especially true when examin-
ing state economic regulations under the theory of substantive due pro-
cess. One reason for the differing standards of substantive due process 
is the United States has adopted a federalist system of government. As a 
result of our system of government, the due process guarantee is ex-
pressed in two places in the United States Constitution2 and in almost 
every state constitution. 3 Because not all state court interpretations of 
due process are exactly the same as the federal interpretations, a funda-
mental tension exists between the application of state and federal law.4 
This comment will examine the varying standards of substantive 
due process analysis used by courts when examining state economic 
regulations. Part I will describe the history of substantive due process 
jurisprudence and trace its history in federal and state constitutional 
law. Part II will contrast the standards of substantive due process anal-
ysis that are derived from the federal constitution with the standards 
derived from state constitutions. Part III will compare the inconsistent 
results between the divergent standards for defining substantive due 
process. Finally, Part IV will examine some of the consequences of in-
consistent standards of due process. 
I. EsTABLISHMENT OF DuE PRocEss 
The right to due process of law has been called the most basic 
right of our constitutional system. 11 The concept of the protection of due 
1. U.S. CoNST. amend. V; U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, sec. 1. 
2. Id. 
3. For a discussion of states which have adopted due process clauses see infra note 6 and 
accompanying text. 
4. For a discussion of inconsistent standards see infra text accompanying notes 63-109. 
5. See R. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL TREATISE OF 
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process of law is so basic to our society that it is codified in the U.S. 
Constitution and in almost every state constitution.6 
The notion of a due process guarantee emanates from the Magna 
Carta. 7 In the Magna Carta, freemen were guaranteed the privilege of 
fair application of the laws. The historical concept of due process was 
simply that the executive and judicial departments of government must 
proceed according to the "law of the land. " 8 Despite the fact that the 
Magna Carta only gave freemen guaranteed rights, it embodied the 
concept that governments should be governed by laws. 9 
When the English colonists came to America, they brought with 
them the fundamental principles of law which they enjoyed in England. 
Virginia was the first colony to draw up a Bill of Rights which con-
tained a due process clause to protect individual rights. 10 In time, most 
colonies adopted a due process protection and the clause also became 
part of the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution. 11 
A. Due Process in the Federal Constitution 
After the ratification of the constitution, the due process clause be-
THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FoLLOWED BY CouRTs IN THE APPLICATION oF THE CoNCEPT 
OF THE "LAW OF THE LAND", iii, 46, 90-95, 159-60 (1926). 
6. Id. at 26. All but five states have due process clauses or their equivalent. Those five states, 
New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, Oregon, and Kansas, have clauses that guarantee a right to life, 
liberty, and property, but not to due process of law. LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND 
OF CoLUMBIA UNIV., INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CoNSTITUTIONS 691-92, supp. 132 (1959, 1965). 
Those states whose due process clause is identical to the Federal Constitution include ALA. 
CoNST. art. I, d. 7; ARIZ. CaNST. art. II, cl. 4.; ARK. CoNST. art. II, cl. 8; CAL. CoNST. art. I, cl. 
13; CoLo. CoNST. art. II, cl. 25; FLA. CoNST. D.R. 25; GA. CoNsT. art. I, sec. 1, d. 3; IDAHO 
CaNST. art. I, cl. 13; ILL. CoNST. art. II, cl. 2; IowA CoNST. art. I, cl. 9; LA. CoNST. art. I, cl. 2; 
ME. CoNST. art. I, cl. 6-a; MICH. CoNST. art. I, cl. 7; MINN. CoNST. art. I, cl. 6; Miss. CaNST. 
art. III, cl. 14; Mo. CoNST. art. I, cl. 10; MoNT. CoNsT. art. III, cl. 27; NEB. CoNST. art. I, cl. 
3; NEv. CoNST. art. I, cl. 8; N.M. CoNST. art. II, cl. 18; N.Y. CoNST. art. I, cl. 6; N.D. CaNST. 
I, cl. 13; OKLA. CoNST. art. II, cl. 7; S.C. CoNST. art. I, d. 5; S.D. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2; UTAH 
CoNST. art. I, cl. 7; WASH. CoNST. art. I, cl. 3; WYo. CoNST. art. I, cl. 6. 
7. See MoTT, supra note 5, at 1-13; See also A. HowARD, THE RoAn FROM RuNNYMEDE: 
MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONAI.ISM IN AMERICA, 1, 345-68 (1968). 
8. Goldberg, "Interpretation" of "Due Process of Law"- A Study in Futility, 13 PAC. L. 
J 365 (1982) 
9. See MoTT, supra note 5, at 2. The actual protection found in the Magna Carta is 
phrased as follows: "No free-man's body shall be taken, nor imprisoned, nor disseized nor out-
lawed, nor banished, nor in any ways be damaged, nor shall the King send him to prison by force, 
excepting by judgment of his peers and by the Law of the Land." B. BARRINGTON, MAGNA 
CARTA 220 (1900) (emphasis added). 
10. Morr, supra note 5, at 14. Two other colonies had framed constitutions before Virginia; 
however, these colonies did not contain a guarantee of individual rights. Those colonies were New 
Hampshire and South Carolina. G. FISHER, THE EvoLUTION OF THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 70-77 (1910). 
11. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. The due process clause is also found in the post civil war 
amendments. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, sec. 1. 
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came one the most frequently used checks against intrusive governmen-
tal behavior. 12 From this substantial body of case law, two concepts of 
due process evolved: proceduraP3 and substantive due process. 14 
Of the two types of due process, substantive due process has 
proved the most controversial. 111 Commentators have described substan-
tive due process "as a guarantor against certain governmental actions 
that have the effect of depriving persons of life, liberty, or property 
interests, regardless of the fairness of the procedure .... " 16 In other 
words, substantive due process limits governmental intrusion in areas 
which are protected. If the court finds a threat to a person's life, lib-
erty, or property rights, then the court may strike down the regulation 
which threatens that interest unless the state can prove why the intru-
sion should be maintained. Therefore, the key to a substantive due pro-
cess case 1s the finding of an infringement on a protected right. 17 
B. Applying Due Process to the States 
Under the federalist system of government which the United States 
Constitution adopts, the individual states are also considered sovereign 
entities. 18 Because each state has its own constitution to govern its sov-
ereign affairs, there exists a dual constitutional system in the United 
States. 19 
12. MoTT, supra note 5, at iii. 
13. Procedural due process protections mean that: 
If life, liberty, or property is at stake, the individual has a right to a fair procedure. 
The question then focuses on the nature of the "process" that is "due." In all instances 
the state must adhere to previously declared rules for adjudicating the claim or at least 
not deviate from them in a manner which is unfair to the individual against whom the 
action is to be taken. The government always has the obligation of providing a neutral 
decisionmaker - one who is not inherently biased against the individual or who has 
personal interest in the outcome. 
J. NowAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YouNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 477 (1978). See also G. GuN-
THER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 405-585 (1985). 
For purposes of this Comment, only the theories of substantive due process review of eco-
nomic regulations will be examined. 
14. For a discussion of the evolution of substantive due process analysis see infra notes 39-56 
and accompanying text. 
15. See infra text accompanying note 43. 
16. R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THt: CONSTITUTION, 161 (1983). 
17. For a complete description of substantive due process see NOWAK, RoTUNDA & YouNG, 
supra note 13, at 385 - 450. 
18. See U.S. CoNST. amend. X. 
19. In the United States Constitution, the tenth amendment provides: "The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNST. amend. X. 
Justice Abrahamson, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice, wrote: "Our founding fathers left us 
with two governments, state and federal - two governments governing the same people in the 
same geographical territory .... Thus we live in a country with a dual court system, federal and 
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1. Fifth amendment due process and the states 
Originally the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights did not 
apply to actions by the individual states because those actions were 
deemed to be within the domain of state constitutions. Therefore, the 
due process clause of the fifth amendment did not apply to the states. 
This proposition was established in a line of cases beginning with Bar-
ron v. Mayor of Baltimore. 20 
The lack of a federally enforced Bill of Rights on state action came 
to a heated climax during the period surrounding the Civil War. 21 Af-
ter the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment was adopted to ensure 
that states give their citizens, including former slaves, the protection of 
due process and other rights. 
2. Fourteenth amendment due process and the states 
The fourteenth amendment specifically applied the protections of 
due process to citizens of the states against the operation of state laws. 22 
Therefore, all state laws could be challenged in federal or state courts 
under the federal constitution. 23 
The adoption of the due process clause in the fourteenth amend-
ment is important for one other reason, it also allows for most of the 
state, operating side by side." Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 954 
(1981) 
20. 32 U.S. (Pet.) 243 (1833). In Barron, Chief Justice Marshall stated: 
The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for 
themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual 
states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, provided 
such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judg-
ment dictated. 
!d. at 247. See also Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 378 n.5 (1958) (lists the cases which held 
that the Bill of Rights in the federal constitution did not apply to the states). 
21. Abrahamson, supra note 19, at 956 ("Nationalism was the spirit of the Civil War."). 
22. Section I of the fourteenth amendment provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law; nor shall any State deprive any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV. sec. I (emphasis added). This amendment was proposed for ratification 
in 1866 and adopted in 1868. 
23. Under the dual constitutional system of federalism: 
the [U.S.] Constitution generally limits state powers to affect the lives and liberties of 
the people by requiring such governmental action to be reasonable. Thus, ... the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires state legislation affecting private 
interests to be reasonable, and to have a reasonable relationship to one of the legitimate 
governmental ends, such as public health, safety etc. 
C. ANTIEAU, STATES' RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS II (1984). 
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other rights in the Bill of Rights to be imposed upon the states. Since 
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court has used 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to incorporate as 
checks on the states the freedoms of the first amendment and most, but 
not all, of the other rights specified in the Bill of Rights.24 
Because of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, state 
laws can be challenged in either a federal or state court under the stan-
dards of the federal constitution. Therefore, the federal standards of 
due process form a minimum threshold of protection for individuals 
against state laws. 2 !j However, state laws can also be challenged in state 
courts under their respective state constitution and the federal constitu-
tional standards can prove to be irrelevant.26 
24. See Guminski, The Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of the American People: A Dis-
junctive Theory of Selective Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 7 WHITTIER L. REv. 765, 766 
(1985). 
In considering what rights the due process clause incorporates, the Supreme Court distin-
guishes between rights and liberties which are fundamental, and those which are not. The due 
process clause incorporates only those rights and liberties specified in the Bill of Rights that are 
deemed by the Supreme Court to be fundamental. A fundamental right or liberty is one which 
"cannot be denied without violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie 
at the base of all our civil and political institutions.'" Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) 
(quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)). 
Cases which held that specific rights have been incorporated include: Everson v. Board of 
Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947) (amend. 1: no establishment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 
(1940) (amend. 1: free exercise); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) and Grosjean v. 
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (amend. 1: free speech, free press); DeJonge v. Oregon, 
299 U.S. 353 (1937) (amend 1: free assembly); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 C.S. 643 (1961) and Ker v. 
California, 374 U.S. 23 ( 1963) (amend. IV: unreasonable searches and seizures); Benton v. Mary-
land, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (amend. V: double jeopardy); Malloy v. Hogan. 378 U.S. 1 (1964) 
(amend. V: self-incrimination); Pennsylvania Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978) (amend. V: just compensation); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (amend. 
VI: speedy trial); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1949) and Gannett Co. v. D~Pasquale, 443 U.S. 
368 (1979) !amend. VI: public trial); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (amend. VI: jury 
trial); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S 717 ( 1961) and Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 ( 1963) (amend. 
VI: impartial jury); Cole V. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307 (1979) (amend. VI: notice of charges); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 ( 1965) (amend. VI: 
confrontation); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (amend. VI: compulsory process); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (amend. VI: right to counsel); Schlib v. Kuebel, 404 
U.S. 357 (1971) (amend. VI: excessive bail); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and 
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (amend. VIII: cruel and unusual punishment); Presser v. 
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) and Miller V. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894) (amend. II: right to keep 
and bear arms); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (amend. V: grand jury); Walker v. 
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876) (amend. VII: civil jury trial); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
484 (1965) (amend. III, the prohibition of the quartering of soldiers). 
25. See Abrahamson, supra note 19, at 963. 
26. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, stated: 
[A] state court is entirely free to read its own constitution more broadly than this Court 
reads the Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by this Court in 
favor of a different analysis of its corresponding constitutional guarantee. 
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 ( 1982). See also infra note 63 and 
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C. History of Substantive Due Process in State Constitutions 
The early states had 'law of the land' clauses in their constitutions 
instead of due process clauses.27 Later some states adopted both law of 
the land clauses and due process clauses, and others adopted only due 
process clauses. This variation made no difference to American courts, 
because they treated 'law of the land' and 'due process' as synonyms.28 
The treatment of the two terms as synonymous has been attributed to 
the interpretation of the English Justice, Lord Coke. Justice Curtis, 
quoting from Lord Coke, stated, "[t]he words, 'due process of law,' 
were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words 
'by the law of the land,' in the Magna Carta."29 
Even though the terms "due process of law" and the "law of the 
land" are commonly regarded as synonymous, not all states apply those 
terms in the same context. At least four separate types of due process 
clauses can be found in various state constitutions. 30 Because of the dif-
ferent contexts which surround due process clauses, different state 
courts interpret their respective clauses differently. 
The difference in interpretation given to state due process clauses 
is becoming of greater importance because state constitutions and indi-
vidual rights under those constitutions are receiving new attention. 31 
Supreme court justices in many of the states are openly advocating 
greater use of state constitutional law. For example Justice Abraham-
son of the Wisconsin Supreme Court expects the 1980's to be "the dec-
ade of the state courts."32 Justice Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court expects a renaissance in state constitutional law and contends 
"that for the balance of this century state constitutions will play an 
accompanying text. 
27. "[T]hat no man be deprived of his liberty except by the law of the land, or the judgment 
of his peers." VA. CoNST. ch. I, art. VIII. See also MoTT, supra note 5, at 14. 
28. Goldberg, supra note 8, at 366. 
29. Murray v. Hoboken, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855). See also Greene v. Briggs, 10 
F. Cas. 1135, 1140 (C.C.D.R.I. 1852); Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 55 (1817). For an early 
reference to the similarity of the two phrases see Zylstra v. Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382, 391 
(1794). 
!d. 
30. See MoTT, supra note 5, at 29. 
The four types of due process clauses are: 1) 'Law of the land' in an article dealing 
with criminal procedure. 2) 'Law of the land' in an independent section. 3) 'Due pro-
cess' in an article dealing with criminal procedure. 4) 'Due process' in an independent 
section. Presently the due process clause in an independent section is the most common. 
31. Clay, Human Freedom and State Constitutional Law; Part One, The Renaissance, 70 
MASS. L. REV. 161, 163 (1986). 
32. Abrahamson, supra note 19, at 951. "In the 1980s it may well be the state supreme 
court, not the United States Supreme Court, that will be the significant constitutional law court.'' 
Id. at 952. 
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increasingly important role in guaranteeing fundamental rights."33 Jus-
tice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court believes that the state courts 
will use their constitutions to decide constitutional issues that they had 
previously left to the U.S. Supreme Court. 34 Justice Utter, a Washing-
ton Supreme Court Justice, believes that the appellate courts in a ma-
jority of the states have interpreted provisions of their state constitutions 
as providing greater protection for individual rights than the federal 
constitution. 311 Finally, Justice Mosk of California refers to the "phoe-
nix-like resurrection of federalism." 36 Justice Utter recognized this 
trend in his court when he commented, "[i]ncreasingly, Washington 
courts are being asked to consider our Declaration [of Rights] as an 
independent and effective source of protection for individual rights, in-
cluding some rights not recognized or protected by the United States 
Supreme Court, and to give our state constitution a truly independent 
interpretation. "37 
Because state courts are being asked to consider the same types of 
questions which federal courts also consider, special attention must be 
paid to the relationship between federal and state judiciaries. When 
there are issues which may be litigated under the federal constitution or 
a state counterpart, questions arise regarding the deference which 
should be given to each document. These questions include whether the 
state or federal constitution should be raised first; whether and how a 
comparison should be made with federal and state constitutional provi-
sions; and how to weigh federal precedents. 38 
33. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RuTGERS 
L. Rr.v. 707 (1983). 
34. Linde, E. Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. Rr.v. 165, 
166 (1984) ("State courts are returning to their state charters to deal with issues that for forty 
years they left to be debated and resolved by the national Supreme Court."). 
35. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions 
and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGF.T SouND L. REv. 491, 499 n.29 (1984) 
(containing a list of those states). 
36. Mosk, State Constitutionalism after Warren: Avoiding the Potomac's Ebb and Flow, in 
Dt:VELOPMENTS IN STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 201 (McGraw, ed. 1985). Justice Mosk refers 
to the revitalization of state constitutional law as a "Phoenix-like resurrection" because state con-
stitutional law has not been a major source of litigation since before the civil law. Prior to the civil 
war, state constitutional law was the only avenue of attack on state regulations because the federal 
constitution did not apply. Then the fourteenth amendment made the federal constitution applica-
ble to the states and the federal constitution became more frequently used to attack state law than 
state constitutions. The recent revival of state constitutional law as a font for litigation is the 
"phoenix-like resurrection." /d. 
37. Utter, supra note 35, at 492. 
38. /d. See also infra Part IV. 
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II. INTERPRETATION OF SuBSTANTIVE DuE PROCESS 
Courts have long struggled with a standard which would give sub-
stance to the limitation that rights cannot be deprived without due pro-
cess. The early existence of this struggle is evidenced by the fact that a 
decade after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, Justice Miller 
wrote, "the constitutional meaning of the phrase 'due process of law' 
remains to-day without that satisfactory precision of definition which 
judicial decisions have given to nearly all other guarantees of personal 
rights. " 39 
A. United States Supreme Court Interpretation of Due Process 
As Justice Miller pointed out, the United States Supreme Court 
did not always have a clear definition in mind when it handed down 
decisions on due process cases. 
1. Due process as a check on legislation 
Almost since the nation began, the justices of the Supreme Court 
have suggested that the Court has an inherent right to review the sub-
stance of legislation and state action of Congress, state legislatures, or 
administrative agencies.40 The belief that the judiciary has a right to 
review the substance of legislation and administrative practices springs 
from the pre-revolutionary war philosophers who espoused the position 
that certain natural rights prevailed for all men and that a governmen-
tal body could not limit or impair those rights.' 1 
The constitutional provision most used to review the substance of 
legislation is the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.42 
However, judicial examination of the substantive aspects of legislation 
and administrative practices has often met with a storm of opposition. 
"In no part of constitutional law has the search for legitimate ingredi-
ents of constitutional interpretation been more difficult and more con-
troversial than in the turbulent history of substantive due process."43 
39. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1877). 
40. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). In Calder, the Court held that the 
Connecticut legislature had not violated the Constitution when it set aside a probate decree. How-
ever, Justice Chase believeJ that the drafters of the constitutions of the federal and state govern-
ments intended to create governments of limited powers, and that natural law, as well as the 
specific provisions of written constitutions, restricted and regulated governmental power. See id. at 
386-388. Therefore Justice Chase decided that the proper role of the Supreme Court was to inval-
idate legislation if the justices believed that it interfered with rights vested in the people. 
41. NOWAK, RoTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 13, at 385. 
42. See Comment, Substantive Due Process Challenges: Are They Creeping into Education 
under a New Standard of Review?, 2 B.Y.U. ]. OF PuB. L. 307, 309 (1988). 
43. Gunther, supra note 13 at 441. 
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In the early 1800's, state courts held that the due process clause 
did not embody a restriction on the substance of legislation. This point 
is clearly stated in the state court opinion of Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward. 44 The state court held that legislative acts "if not 
repugnant to any other constitutional provision, are 'the law of the 
land' within the sense of the constitution."45 However, when 
Dartmouth College46 reached the Supreme Court, the argument sup-
porting a constitutional limit on legislatures was successful.47 The 
Court, in reaching their Dartmouth College decision, adopted a blend 
of what we now call procedural due process, substantive due process, 
equal protection, and separation of powers.48 
After Dartmouth College, the High Court vacillated several times 
on whether the due process clause restricted the legislature from pass-
ing certain types of legislation. The Supreme Court stated in two sepa-
rate opinions that historically due process was not intended as a check 
on legislation.49 However, by the mid 1800's the Court seemed to ac-
cept the argument that due process could be used to place a restraint on 
legislatures. Justice Curtis wrote of the fifth amendment: 
The article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive 
and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as 
to leave congress free to make any process 'due process of law,' by its 
mere will.60 
44. 1 N.H. 111,64 N.H. 473 (1817). 
45. !d. at 132, 64 N.H. at 639. 
46. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581-82 (1819). 
47. See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 369. 
48. ld. Dartmouth College held that permission by the Court for the legislature to make any 
act the law of the land "would render constitutional provisions of the highest importance com-
pletely inoperative and void." Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 581-82. According to 
Cooley, this was the most quoted definition of due process. In addition to being the most quoted, it 
was "apt and suitable," and "entirely correct'' T. Coou:v, CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 353, 
354 (1868). 
49. In 1877, the Court noted that the English barons who coerced the Magna Carta from 
King John did not intend "to protect themselves against the enactment of laws hy the Parliament," 
in which "those barons were a controlling element." Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 
(1877). Again in 1884, the Court stated that: 
It did not enter into the minds of the barons to provide security against their own body 
or in favor of the Commons by limiting the power of Parliament. ... The actual and 
practical security for English liberty against legislative tyranny was the power of a free 
public opinion represented by the Commons. 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884). 
50. Murray v. Hoboken, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855). The Supreme Court's state-
ment follows several state court opinions which adopt this position. Judge Catron, who later be-
came a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, said of due process: 
Its infraction was a leading cause why we separated from that country [England], and 
its value as a fundamental rule for the protection of the citizen against legislative usur-
pation was the reason for its adoption as part of our [Tennessee] constitution. 
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The trend toward the use of substantive due process analysis by 
the federal bench to invalidate economic legislation reached its apex 
during the early part of the twentieth century. This time period became 
known as the Lochner era.~"il During this period, the United States Su-
preme Court struck down many economic regulations on the grounds of 
substantive due process. One such example is where the Court held 
that the District of Columbia Minimum Wage law, which authorized 
the establishment of a minimum wage for women, was unconstitutional 
interference with liberty to contract. 52 
2. The end of substantive due process review of economic regulations 
in federal courts 
During the 40 years of the Lochner era, the Supreme Court ap-
plied substantive due process to invalidate economic regulations enacted 
by Congress and state legislatures. The Supreme Court's adamant re-
fusal to defer to the judgment of state legislatures in the area of eco-
nomic regulation has been regarded by many as a woeful display of 
judicial activism. 53 
The Supreme Court ended its use of substantive due process as a 
check against economic regulation in the 1930's. In Nebbia v. New 
York, 114 the Court did more than uphold New York's Milk Control 
Law, it signalled the end of the use of substantive due process to strike 
down economic regulation in federal courts. The Nebbia Court articu-
lated the test which has since become the standard for substantive due 
process review of economic regulations under the federal constitution: 
"If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper 
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary or discriminatory, the re-
Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 259, 271 (1829). 
51. The Lochner era is so named because in the case, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905), the Supreme Court adopted a substantive due process interpretation of economic regula-
tions. In this case, the Justices "unabashedly read their philosophy [of laissez-faire economics from 
the teachings of Adam Smith) into the Constitution." F. STRON<;, SUBSTANTIVE Dm: PROCESS OF 
LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SF.NSF. AND NONSENSE 95 (1986). Walton Hamilton characterized the 
majority opinion as professing. "with little qualification, an economic creed; and the empty recep-
tacle of 'due process' and the age-old vitality of 'the common right' enabled them to read 'free 
competition' into the Constitution." Hamilton, Common Right, Due Process and Antitrust, Law 
& Con temp. Probs. 24, 31-32 ( 1940). In Lochner, the Court struck down a state law restricting 
the hours which bakers could work. The Court held that for the law to be valid it must have "a 
more direct relation, as a means to an end" in its provisions. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 70. 
52. Adkins v. Children's Hasp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled, West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 ( 1937) 
53. See Kirby, Expansive judicial Review of Economic Regulation under State Constitu-
tions: The Case for Realism, 48 TENN. L. REv. 241,247 (1981). 
54. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
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quirements of due process are satisfied."1111 
Justice Black explained the reasons why the High Court aban-
doned substantive due process review of economic regulations: 
The doctrine ... that due process authorizes courts to hold laws un-
constitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely ... 
has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original con-
stitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and 
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected 
to pass laws .... Legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment 
with economic problems .. 
We refuse to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of 
legislation," .... ~6 
3. The current standard of review for substantive due process tn 
federal courts 
After the Supreme Court decision in Nebbia v. New York, 117 the 
use of substantive due process was discredited. 118 In recent years, how-
ever, the use of substantive due process has flourished as a haven for 
the protection of fundamental values. 119 Because the Supreme Court has 
55. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537; See also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 
(1937) ("[R]egulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests 
of the community is due process."). 
56. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963). 
57. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
58. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining the constitutional-
ity of Washington state's minimum wage law for women over the plaintiffs allegation that the law 
violated substantive due process); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (up-
holding legislation which prohibited the interstate shipment of "filled milk" by stating that the 
statute must be sustained if any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed 
supports the legislation); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (stating that the 
Court will not only presume that a legislature has a reasonable basis for enacting a particular 
economic measure, but the Court will hypothesize reasons for the law's enactment if the legisla-
ture fails to state explicitly the reasons behind its judgment). 
From the decisions in Parrish, Carolene Products and Lee Optical, it is clear that the Su-
preme Court will not closely scrutinize legislative or administrative acts under substantive due 
process theories if the rights involved are subject to regulation under the police powers of the state. 
In fact, the Court's deference to the state in these matters is so great that even if the legislature 
does not find a legitimate state interest on which to premise its regulations, the Court will hypoth-
esize such an interest. 
59. See, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding that several general constitu-
tional theories combined to create a zone of constitutionally protected privacy which required a 
compelling state interest and a closely tailored statute before the fundamental right of privacy 
could be regulated by the state); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating a Texas anti-
abortion statute on the grounds that the statute violated the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment as an unjustified deprivation of liberty in that it unnecessarily infringed on a woman's 
right to privacy). See also Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical 
Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976); Epstein, Substantive Due 
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applied two different standards of review in substantive due process 
cases a dichotomy in analysis exists. Generally, the Court merely re-
quires that there be a rational relation between the statute and a legiti-
mate state objective.60 However, where the Court finds that a funda-
mental right is impaired by a statute or practice, the Court has applied 
a scrutiny that is stricter in two respects. First, the state's objective 
must be compelling, not merely legitimate, and second, the relation be-
tween that objective and the means must be very close, so that the 
means can be said to be necessary to achieve the end.61 These two stan-
dards of review are the two classic standards under substantive due 
process analysis. 
Therefore, the classic substantive due process analysis involves just 
two standards of review - strict judicial scrutiny under the compelling 
state interest test and minimal judicial scrutiny under rational basis 
analysis. In practice this means that absent a fundamental right, legis-
lators and administrators enjoy great deference, but if a fundamental 
right is found, any infringement on that right is rarely justified.62 
In summary, federal courts have long struggled with the idea of 
substantive due process review of legislation. The federal bench for a 
time supported substantive due process challenges to economic regula-
tions under the theory that the regulations were unconstitutional inva-
sions of the right to contract. That position was discarded by the 
United States Supreme Court in the 1930's. Now the Court holds that 
substantive due process will only invalidate legislation which infringes 
on fundamental rights. For all other rights, the legislature need only 
have a rational basis for passing the legislation. 
Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. Gr. REV. 159. 
The genesis of the special protection for fundamental rights may be traced to the now famous 
footnote 4 in Carotene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4, where Justice Stone, after finding no 
substantive due process protection for an economic right, left the question open concerning 
"whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition ... which 
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." /d. 
60. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) ("[A] state is free to adopt whatever 
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare.") (emphasis added); 
Carotene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 ("[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment 
is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be 
pronounced unconstitutional unless ... it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that 
it rests on some rational basis . ... ") (emphasis added); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-
32 (1963) ("[W]e refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation' .... ") 
(footnotes omitted). 
61. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973). 
62. See GuNTHER, supra note 13, at 454 ("It is only when the 'liberty' allegedly infringed is 
thought to be 'fundamental' deserving of special protection, and thus imposing on the state espe-
cially high burdens of justification for the infringement, that due process turns into an interven-
tionist tool."). 
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B. State Court Interpretation of Due Process 
Because the United States has adopted a federalist system, state 
laws may also be challenged under state constitutions. The United 
States Supreme Court has consistently held that courts may interpret 
state constitutions to be more protective of individual rights than the 
United States Constitution.63 This means that states could construe 
their respective due process clauses in such a way as to protect against 
economic regulations. Three reasons why state court interpretations of 
due process do not need to consistently follow federal court interpreta-
tion include 1) the autonomy which state courts enjoy in interpreting 
their constitutions, 2) the varied legislative history behind the adoption 
of the different state constitutions, and 3) the independent standards 
which state courts have developed to test due process. 
1. State courts may interpret their respective constitutions 
The highest court in every state is the final arbiter of its own con-
stitution.6" Even if the clause has an identical counterpart in the federal 
constitution, the state court may construe the words differently than 
would the U.S. Supreme Court.65 However, the independent authority 
of the state courts in this regard is consistent with federalism. 66 In fact, 
Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court and several other commen-
tators have urged state courts to consider state constitutions before turn-
ing to the United States Bill of Rights and the federal cases construing 
those amendments.67 Under this approach, if a state court rules as a 
matter of state law that a right has been violated and must be re-
dressed, it becomes unnecessary to reach a federal constitutional 
question. 
The independent authority of state courts to decide constitutional 
questions is borne out by the early constitutional history of the United 
States. Most of the early states had declarations of rights some years 
63. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) ("Our reasoning 
... does not ... limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to 
adopt in its own constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Fed-
eral Constitution."); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 n.4 (1975). See generally Brennan, State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977). 
64. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 81; See also Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 
22-23 (1973); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982). 
65. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
66. Brennan, supra note 63, at 501-03; See Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the 
States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980); Pollock, supra note 33 at 708 ("Recent 
decisions from across the country have looked not just at the United States Constitution, but at 
state constitutions, for protection of basic liberties. This trend is well-founded in history, logic and 
the theory underlying our federalist society."). 
67. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 66, at 380. 
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before the United States Bill of Rights was finally adopted. This his-
tory leaves no doubt that state "declarations of rights" were never in-
tended to be dependent on or interpreted in light of the United States 
Bill of Rights. In fact, a strong argument can be made that the Bill of 
Rights was added to meet demands for the same guarantees against the 
federal government that people enjoyed against their state govern-
ments.68 Perhaps this is why state courts have led the United States 
Supreme Court in developing techniques for protection of individual 
rights69 that the Supreme Court has later adopted and read into the 
United States Constitution.70 
2. Legislative intent behind state constitutions has been varied 
For most constitutional litigation, the intent of the framers of a 
constitution is a significant touchstone for determining the appropriate 
interpretation of the constitution. Therefore, the legislative history be-
hind a state constitution is of great importance for state judges deciding 
how to apply state due process clauses. The legislative history behind 
the adoption of the 50 state constitutions is not the same as the legisla-
tive history behind the Bill of Rights. State constitutions adopted due 
process protections long before the federal constitution and also long 
after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment.71 
Even if a state adopted a due process clause which is identical to 
the fifth amendment, the concept behind due process might have been 
understood differently by the state constitutional convention which 
adopted the clause. Justice Utter noted: 
Given the vast difference in culture, politics, experience, education, 
and economic status between the Northwestern framers of the 1889 
[Washington state constitution) and the Eastern framers of the United 
States Bill of Rights in 1789, and the enormous differences of history 
and local conditions that separated the two conventions, it is unlikely 
that the two documents were written by men with much more in com-
mon than a shared language and a similar, if vague, democratic phi-
losophy. Thus even in the relatively few cases where the two docu-
68. Linde, supra note 66, at 379. 
69. See, e.g., State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 166, 96 N.W. 730,731 (1903) (exclusionary 
rule); Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wise. 249, 250-51 (1859) (right to counsel); Coleman v. 
MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 712-13, 98 P. 281, 281-82 (1908) (freedom of the press); City of 
Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 608-09, 139 N.E. 86, 90-91 (1923) (freedom of the press). 
70. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (noted that 22 states had acknowledged 
that a fair trial included right to counsel); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) 
(cited state court opinions which used the "actual malice" standard in libel cases). See also 
Blanchard, Filling in the Void: Speech and Press in State Courts Prior to Cit/ow, in FIRST 
AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED 14-59 (B. Chamberlin & C. Brown eds. 1982). 
71. See supra note 6. 
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ments used identical language, the intent could be quite different. 
Although it is difficult to say just what phrases like ... "due process" 
meant to a Northwestern pioneer in 1889, it is probably safe to say 
that they did not mean exactly the same thing that they meant to an 
aristocratic Virginia plantation owner and slaveholder of 1789.72 
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3. State courts use independent standards to interpret their respec-
tive due process clauses 
Some states have adopted alternative standards by which to decide 
substantive due process issues. The classic substantive due process anal-
ysis in federal courts involves just two standards of review - strict 
judicial scrutiny under the compelling state interest test and minimal 
judicial scrutiny under the rational basis analysis. However, substantive 
due process analysis in state courts can involve other factors. For exam-
ple, one alternative standard used in some state courts is the "affected 
with a public interest" test.73 This sort of a test is one of the variations 
of substantive due process analysis because it balances public interest 
policy considerations against the need for the legislation rather than 
merely employing one of the two standards of review used by federal 
courts. 74 
The use of variant standards of review has many ramifications, 
one of which is the greater use of substantive due process analysis. The 
variant standards of review employed by many states are more likely to 
lead to increased substantive due process analysis of state legislative acts 
because the state standards are more receptive of the policy considera-
tions behind substantive due process arguments.76 
C. justifications for State Courts to Uphold Substantive Due 
Process Challenges to Economic Regulations 
Commentators have given several justifications for the states to en-
dorse substantive due process challenges to economic regulations when 
the federal courts have specifically rejected those challenges. These jus-
tifications include the nature of state constitutions, other state constitu-
72. U tler, supra note 35, at 496; See Linde, supra note 66, at 383. 
73. E.g., Estell v. City of Birmingham, 291 Ala. 680, 286 So. 2d 872 (1973); See Note, 
Rediscovering Means Analysis in State Economic Substantive Due Process, 34 ALA. L. REV. 161, 
163 (1983). 
74. Justice Linde wrote that some states adopted alternate tests for substantive due process 
"as a way to apply prudential and ethical tests to legislation and .... [the] resolution of constitu-
tional issues consists in 'balancing competing interests.' " Linde, supra note 34, at 186. 
75. See also Comment, Developments In the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional 
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1463-93 (1982). For a more complete discussion of states which 
endorse substantive due process challenges see infra Part III. 
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tiona! directives, and local factors which are peculiar to state courts. 
1. The nature of state constitutions 
Substantive due process review is fundamentally an exercise in 
constitutional interpretation. "When a state court invalidates a legisla-
tive enactment because it impermissibly violates the property rights of 
its citizens, it does so by relying entirely or in part on its own state 
constitution, so the state constitution is really the touchstone in these 
matters."76 Thus, the first justification for the persistence of substantive 
due process outside of federal courts is analogous to the basic proposi-
tion that a state has the "sovereign right to adopt in its own constitu-
tion individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the 
Federal Constitution. " 77 
2. Other state constitutional directives 
The second justification for states adopting substantive due process 
challenges to economic regulation lies in the other directives of a partic-
ular state constitution. The text of a particular state constitution may 
contain language which, unlike the federal constitution, essentially di-
rects the judiciary to engage in a substantive review of legislative enact-
ments affecting property rights.78 For example, when the Ohio Consti-
tution pronounces, "Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but 
subservient to the public welfare,"79 an Ohio court is probably justified 
in scrutinizing state-enacted economic regulations for evidence that the 
regulations do in fact benefit the public welfare. 
3. Local factors 
The final justification for the greater indulgence in substantive due 
process review by state courts could be called the "local factors" ration-
ale. Several commentators have suggested that certain factors better jus-
tify economic review at the state than at the federal level. 80 According 
to this rationale, the relationship between the legislature, the constitu-
tion, and the judiciary may be such that closer judicial scrutiny is not 
onerous because of particular checks and balances in a state govern-
ment. For example, Professor Hetherington suggested that state courts 
76. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAw, LITIGATION ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE SERIES LITIGATION HANDBOOK SERIES NuM-
BER 277, 111 (1985) [hereinafter RECENT DEvt:LOPMENTS]. 
77. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). 
78. See Brennan, supra note 63, at 1479-80. 
79. OHIO CoNST. art I, sec. 19. 
80. See infra note 86. 
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are more attuned to local economic conditions than federal courts, and 
therefore more trustworthy in the application of substantive due 
process.81 
Another local factor is that many state constitutions are easier to 
amend,82 and thus, mistakes made by the judiciary in interpreting state 
constitutions can be more easily corrected.83 Commentators who adopt 
this justification contend that the use of substantive due process by the 
courts is arguably less dangerous if the legislature can quickly respond 
to judicial intrusion via a constitutional amendment. 84 
An additional local factor invoked by state courts is the anti-demo-
cratic effect of lobbying groups on state legislatures which, it is implied, 
can only be remedied by the judiciary.811 According to this rationale, 
state legislatures, being small and poorly staffed, are more susceptible 
to the lobbying efforts of special interest groups and more likely to pass 
economic regulations which infringe on the public good. While this ar-
gument contains more than a grain of truth, it smacks of the sort of 
condescension towards elected officials and disrespect for their judgment 
which the United States Supreme Court rejected when it rejected sub-
stantive due process. 86 
81. See Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law: 
Part 2, 53 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 248-51 (1958). 
82. Linde, supra note 34, at 192 ("[S]tate constitutions, like state laws, are easily amended. 
When a court demonstrates in the most eloquent terms that the death penalty is a relic of barbaric 
vengeance contrary to the ideals of humane society, what is the court to say when the people 
immediately amend their constitution to reinstate capital punishment."). 
83. See Note, Counterrevolution in State Constitutional Law, 15 STAN. L. REv. 309, 326-
30 (1963). 
84. /d. ("Because state constitutions are easier to amend, judicial review can be more effec-
tively checked."). For example, the highest courts in Massachusetts and California declared that 
the death penalty violated their state constitutional bans against cruel and inhumane punishment. 
See District Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648,664-65,411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (1980); People v. 
Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, I 00 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied 406 US. '!58 ( 1972). 
However, initiative measures were adopted to reinstate the death penalty. MAss. CoNST. pt. I, 
art. XVI; CAL. CoNST. art I, § 27 (1879, amend. 1982). 
85. See, e.g., State v. Cromwell, 72 N.D. 565, 580, 9 N.W.2d 914, 922 (1943) ("[I[t is a 
matter of common knowledge that pressure groups are frequently able to bring about legislative 
action they believe will be to their advantage by their argument that it is needed for the protection 
of the public."). 
86. See Hetherington, supra note 81, at 248-51 (ability of state courts to tailor decisiom to 
local conditions and needs); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 
MINN. L. REV. 91, 117-18 (1950) (shorter legislative sessions and concentrated special interest 
lobbying justify increased judicial review of state legislation); Note, State Views on f<.'conomic Due 
Process: 1937-1953, 53 CoLUM. L. REV. 827, 843-45 (1953) (shorter legislative sessions and 
legislative pay justify review). 
However, Not all commentators agree on this point. See Carpenter, Our Constitutional Heri-
tage: Economic Due Process and the State Courts, 45 A.B.A. J. 1027 (1959); Kirby, Expansive 
Judicial Review of Economic Regulation Under State Constitutions: The Case for Realism, 48 
TENN. L. REv. 241 ( 1981 ); Comment, Substantive Due Process in the States Revisited, 18 OHIO 
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III. INCONSISTENCIES IN DEFINING DuE PROCESS 
As Part II indicated, substantive due process in the states can be 
measured by different standards than substantive due process under the 
federal constitution. Because of these differing standards, cases with 
similar facts can result in dissimilar outcomes. 
A. Inconsistencies Between the Due Process of the Federal 
Constitution and the Due Process of State Constitutions 
One of the starkest examples of inconsistent outcomes in cases in-
volving similar facts can be seen in the regulation of milk prices. In 
Nebbia v. New York,S7 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a law passed 
by the New York legislature establishing a Milk Control Board, with 
the right to set minimum and maximum resale prices for milk, did not 
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.88 Despite 
the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court held that regulation of milk prices 
did not violate the due process clause of the federal constitution, forty 
years later, a state court reached a directly contrary result based on its 
state due process clause.89 
In Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Nebraska Dairy Products Board,90 the 
Nebraska Supreme Court held that a milk price regulation scheme was 
unconstitutional as an invasion of the property rights of the individual 
protected by the due process clause of the Nebraska state Constitu-
tion.91 The dissent in Gillette Dairy recognized that the regulations in 
question would not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment and bitterly complained that "[r]egulations and statutes 
similar to those involved here have long been upheld as being constitu-
tional."92 The disparity of results in Gillette Dairy and Nebbia illus-
Sr. L. J. 384 (1957). 
87. 291 U.S. at 502. For a more complete discussion of Nebbia see supra notes 53-58 and 
accompanying text. 
88. !d. at 539 ("So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, ... a state is free to 
adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to 
enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose."). 
89. Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Nebraska Dairy Prods. Bd., 192 Neb. 89, 219 N.W.2d 214 
(1974). 
90. 192 Neb. 89, 219 N.W.2d 214 (1974). 
91. Gillette Dairy, 219 N.W.2d at 218, 220 ("This court cannot give judicial approval to 
legislation that violates .... Article I, section 3 of the Constitution of this state, commonly re-
ferred to as the due process clause."). 
92. Gillette Dairy, 219 N.W.2d at 224 (Clinton, J., dissenting, citing Nebbia v. New York, 
291 U.S. 502 (1933)). The dissent went on to quote Nebbia and its declaration that under the 
fourteenth amendment, "[i]f the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper 
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process 
are satisfied, ... " !d. at 225. The dissent concludes that "the majority opinion judges not the 
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trate that substantive due process arguments based on state constitu-
tional clauses remain an effective way to strike down economic 
regulations which would survive an attack under the federal 
constitution.93 
Another example of this type of inconsistency is found in the legis-
lative limitations on the funding of abortions. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has upheld congressional restrictions on government funding for abor-
tions and rejected due process arguments for invalidating those funding 
restrictions.94 However, under their state due process clauses, many 
state courts have refused to allow state legislatures to restrict state 
funding of abortion. For example, courts in California, Connecticut, 
and Massachusetts have relied upon their own constitutions to hold that 
state health insurance programs must subsidize both pregnancy and 
abortion expenses on equal terms. 911 "Colorado, New Jersey, and Ore-
gon also require state subsidization of abortion expenses pursuant to 
their own constitutions."96 
B. Inconsistent Outcomes When Similar Statutes Are Challenged tn 
the States 
When a state court conducts a substantive due process inquiry into 
the validity of government imposed price regulations, "the results can 
be unpredictable and remarkable."97 For example, the Alabama Su-
preme Court has struck down an "anti-scalping" ordinance as an un-
constitutional price fixing regulation which violated the ticket-holder's 
property rights.98 However, other state courts have expressly rejected 
the Alabama court's interpretation of the scalper's due process rights.99 
constitutionality of the legislation, but its wisdom." !d. at 222. 
93. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 76, at 107-08. 
94. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980) (upholding the "Hyde Amendment," 
Pub. L. No. 94-439, sec. 209, 90 Stat. 1418 (1976)). 
95. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 
Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981) (relying on CAL. CoNST. art. I, sec. 1); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 40 
Conn. Supp. 394 (1986); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 17 N.E.2d 387 (1981) (relying on 
MASS CoNST. pt. 1, art. X; pt 2, ch.1, arts. I-III). 
96. Utter, supra note 35, at 504. 
97. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 76, at 118. 
98. In re Extell v. City of Birmingham, 291 Ala. 680, 286 So. 2d 872, 875 (1973) ("These 
are arbitrary and unreasonable interferences with the rights of the individuals concerned ... and 
is offensive to the declarations and guarantees of [Alabama's] Bill of Rights, . ."). 
99. See State v. Major, 243 Ga. 255, 253 S.E.2d 724 (1979) (holding that the government 
may restrict a scalper's property right in his tickets without violating due process). Accord State v. 
Spann, 623 S.W.2d 272 (Tenn. 1981); State v. Youker, 36 Or. App. 609, 585 P.2d 43,44 (1978). 
Cf Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817,821 (S.D.N.Y 1964), afj'd without opinion, 380 U.S. 520 
(1965) (holding that New York General Business Law which sets a maximum resale price for 
tickets to public places does not violate the federal constitution's due process clause). 
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Inconsistent results have also been reached in the area of legisla-
tive restrictions to business practices. Typically, state courts have fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's reasoning in upholding or rejecting chal-
lenges to business regulations. However, this is not always the case. 
One such example is in the case of weight and size limitations on 
trucks traveling public roads. The Supreme Court has held that when a 
state imposes weight and size limitations on trucks, it acts within the 
scope of its police power and does not offend the due process clause of 
the federal constitution.100 State courts usually have followed the Su-
preme Court and upheld weight and size limitations as constitu-
tional.101 However, some state courts have found that restrictions on 
weight and size "do not ... bear a reasonable relationship to the de-
clared objective of public safety and, therefore, deny due process."102 
Whether a given weight or size limitation will withstand substantive 
due process analysis is difficult to predict in states which allow such 
challenges to economic regulations. Results vary even within a single 
jurisdiction, because the reasonable relationship test, as applied by state 
courts, is inherently flexible. 103 
Another example of departures by the states from the standards of 
due process set by the United States Supreme Court is found in the 
regulation of entry into a business or profession. When a state legisla-
ture sets standards in an industry or profession, it inevitably excludes 
some potential entrants. 104 Furthermore, the process is subject to abuse, 
100. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1932); cf National Tank Truck Carriers, 
Inc. v. City of New York, 677 F.2d 270, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that city regulations on 
transporting hazardous gases by trucks does not violate the constitution). 
101. E.g., Alexander v. State, 228 Ga. 179, 184 S.E.2d 450 (1971); See generally Annota-
tion, Power to Limit Weight of Vehicle or its Load with Respect to Use of Streets or Highways, 75 
A.L.R.2n 376 (1961). 
102. In reApplication of Martin, 88 Nev. 666, 504 P.2d 14, 16 (1972) ("The ordinance 
may not be justified as traffic safety measures since they were not enacted for that purpose."); See 
also Red River Constr. Co. v. City of Norman, 624 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Okla. 1981) (holding a 
weight restriction on trucks carrying riverbed sand on a particular city street was found to be 
beyond the legitimate police power of the state because such a restriction only increased traffic 
density and the risk to citizens). 
103. Compare Bakery Salvage Corp. v. City of Lackawanna, 24 N.Y.2d 643, 249 N.E.2d 
438, 439, 301 NY.S.2d 581, modified, 24 N.Y.2d 1025, 250 N.E.2d 247, 302 N.Y.S.2d 581 
( 1969) (holding that a traffic ordinance limiting truck weight to five tons was reasonable and did 
not deprive plaintiff of property rights without due process of law) with Peconic Ave. Business-
mens' Ass'n v. Town of Brookhaven, 98 A.D.2d 772, 469 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (1983) (holding that 
an ordinance prohibiting trucks over 5,000 pounds from using a residential street was found un-
constitutional because the street was so wide and well-paved that it could easily withstand the 
passage of trucks). 
104. By its very nature, when a state institutes a requirement which must be met before a 
person can enter a business field, all those who fail to meet the requirement are excluded. Exam-
ples of these type of requirements include denial of permission to practice law to those people who 
have not passed the bar exam. The same is true of doctors, dentists, etc. An example of a challenge 
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particularly since those with vested interests in the business being stan-
dardized will often attempt to influence the elected officials who set the 
standards. 1011 Despite all the arguments against the wisdom of legisla-
tures to regulate business entry requirements, under the federal consti-
tution such regulations do not violate the due process clause if there is 
any rational basis for the regulation. The Supreme Court held that the 
legislature's police power includes the power to "regulate a business in 
such manner as to abate evils deemed to arise from its pursuit" or even 
to forbid the practice of a particular type of business which is "inimical 
to the public welfare." 106 The Supreme Court defers to the legislatures 
to decide what evils must be abated and to define what is inimical to 
public welfare. However, state courts do not always defer to the judg-
ment of the legislature in deciding these issues. The Georgia Supreme 
Court's treatment of its state's franchising regulation is a good example 
of a state court's refusal to defer to the judgment of its legislature. The 
Georgia Supreme Court rejected several versions of the Franchise Prac-
tices Act and finally disposed of the act as violative of substantive due 
process. 107 The court decided that a simple substantive due process 
analysis based on the state constitution was "the surest and safest way 
to give the Franchise Practices Act its final burial."108 
Other states have not followed Georgia's lead in using substantive 
due process challenges to attack franchising statutes. In fact, Georgia 
has remained alone in this posture because other state courts have re-
jected due process attacks on franchise licensing statutes. 109 Even the 
to a business entry regulation is the case of Kotch v. Board of River Pilots, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). 
105. See State v. Cromwell, 72 N.D. 565, 9 N.W.2d 914, 922 (1943) (holding that a statute 
which authorized the licensing of photographers by a board of photographers was held to violate 
due process under the state constitution). 
106. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 426 (1937). 
107. Georgia Franchise Practices Comm'n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 244 Ga. 800, 262 
S.E.Zd I 06, I 08 ( 1979) ("The cited sections violate due process by seeking to regulate an industry 
not affected with a public interest, ... "). 
108. RECENT DEVE:LDPMENTS, supra note 76, at 129. 
109. See, e.g., Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 381 
N.E.Zd 908 (1978); see generally Annotation, Validity and Construction of State Regulating 
Dealing Between Automobile Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers, 7 A.L.R.3o 1173, § 
17[a] (1966 & supp. 1984). 
Besides franchise licensing statutes, different state business regulation laws in general have 
met with inconsistent results when challenged under state due process clauses. Compare In re 
Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.Zd 729, 734 (1973) (hold-
ing that certificate-of-need requirements violate due process and anti-monopoly provisions of 
North Carolina Constitution) with Mount Royal Towers Inc. v. Alabama Bd. of Health, 388 So. 
2d 1209, 1215 (Ala. 1980) (holding that the Certificate-of-need Act, which reduces medical costs 
from duplicated services, does not deprive plaintiff of property or contract rights without due 
process of law under the Alabama Constitution). 
Other regulations which state courts have struck down by developing independent standards 
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United States Supreme Court rejected the basic position taken by the 
Georgia court. 110 
In summary, state courts have not always followed the federal 
courts' standards for substantive due process challenges to economic 
regulations. Some state courts have adopted substantive due process at-
tacks and struck down economic regulations while other states have up-
held similar regulations under the same attacks. Therefore, it is diffi-
cult to determine if a state will uphold or reject a substantive due 
process attack on an economic regulation because courts in different 
states interpret state due process clauses differently. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF ALLOWING INCONSISTENT STANDARDS FOR 
SuBsTANTIVE DuE PROCESS ATTACKS 
Because we have two independent systems of government, state 
and federal, there are going to be inconsistent outcomes in similar cases 
tried in different jurisdictions. 111 Therefore, it must be recognized that 
this inconsistency has some important consequences. Consequences of 
the inconsistent outcomes can include manipulation by the state courts 
to avoid federal review, balancing of federal and state rights, and main-
taining the proper respect for the separate judicial systems. 
A. State Court Manipulation to Avoid Federal Review 
In order to merit immunity from review and reversal by the 
United States Supreme Court, the state court opinion must contain an 
explicit statement that the decision is "alternatively based on bona fide 
separate, adequate, and independent [state] grounds. " 112 This is espe-
cially true in cases where federal law is also discussed. This means that 
when a substantive due process attack is used to invalidate a law, the 
state court must make certain that the analysis used is grounded in 
state constitutional law and not in federal constitutional law. Where 
for due process include education regulations. For a summary of substantive due process in educa-
tion see Comment, Substantive Due Process Challenges: Are They Creeping into Education 
under a New Standard of Review, 2 B.Y.U. J. OF Pus. L. 307 (1988). 
110. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). The Court held that 
"California's [l]egislature was ... constitutionally empowered to enact a general scheme of busi-
ness regulation that imposed reasonable restrictions upon the exercise of the right [to franchise]" 
!d. at 106. 
111. Oregon Supreme Court Justice Linde wrote: "Federalism divides our laws along state 
lines .... This decentralized system of laws displays some divergent legal rights among homoge-
neous societies ... " Linde, supra note 34, at 195. Justice Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court wrote: "[W]e live in a country with a dual court system, . . . Conflict is endemic in the 
system." Abrahamson, supra note 19, at 954. 
112. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). 
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federal cases are cited, the opinion must expressly state that they are 
considered as guidance only and do not "compel the result."113 
Because reliance on federal cases may cause a state court decision 
to be overturned, even if it is ruling on its own constitution, the large 
body of federal due process law cannot be relied upon. This creates the 
need for a precise balancing act between the state and federal due pro-
cess clauses when the two interpretations are inconsistent with each 
other. Therefore, since the state constitution is not the highest law of 
the land,114 every provision must be construed to provide at least as 
much protection as the United States Constitution, any applicable fed-
eral laws, and the Enabling Act which authorized the state constitu-
tional convention. 11~ "This means in part that the [state] Constitution 
cannot affirmatively impair rights protected by the United States 
Constitution. " 116 
B. Balancing of Federal and State Rights 
Because state constitutional interpretations cannot directly contra-
vene any federal constitutional right, a state due process clause can only 
be invoked if it gives a greater protection to individual rights than its 
federal counterpart would. 117 This has both positive and negative as-
pects. One positive aspect is that states can tailor the protection they 
offer to local concerns without falling below a federal constitutional 
minimum. On the other hand, the power to second guess state legisla-
tures can lead to abuse and inequitable results. Additionally, many 
state court decisions, and the analysis in those decisions, have to be 
manipulated so as to avoid a state-federal conflict. 118 
As state courts continue to apply the due process clauses of their 
state constitution expansively, they can provide their citizens with un-
usually strong constitutional protection against arbitrary economic reg-
113. /d. 
114. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; ... , shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Law of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing." U.S. CaNST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
115. Utter, supra note 37, at 510. 
116. /d. See also supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
117. Justice Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote: 
Generally speaking, the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution set a 
minimum level of fundamental liberty for the citizens of the United States. Through 
the fourteenth amendment, most rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are protected 
against interference by the states. A state may add to those rights, but may not subtract 
from them. 
Pollock, supra note 19, at 709. 
118. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text. 
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ulation. Substantive due process challenges to certain regulations give 
state courts a powerful check against the legislative branch of govern-
ment, and a powerful tool for protecting individual rights. However, 
promoting a constitutional doctrine which sanctions the second-guessing 
of legislative judgment is a risk. The risk is that an entrenched judici-
ary will not recognize the value of innovative legislation, and will reject 
new laws whenever the slightest infringement on individual rights ex-
ists. In short, the use of substantive due process in the economic arena 
is a danger that may exalt the imagined rights of a few over the legiti-
mate needs of many. Such danger notwithstanding, economic due pro-
cess in state courts is a modern reality. 
Under our federalist system, that state courts and federal courts 
will not always interpret their respective constitutions in the same man-
ner is expected, even if those constitutions contain phrases with similar 
language or intent. However, a price must be paid for allowing two 
interpretations of the same principle. 
Even if the manipulation of federal case law by state courts is not 
onerous, for "federalism to work, the United States Supreme Court and 
the state courts must maintain a healthy respect for the role each 
plays."119 While it is not crucial to have one uniform constitution or 
constitutional standard for each state, radical departures from federal 
precedent makes a national economy and society less cohesive. 
CONCLUSION 
Due process is a fundamental freedom in American society. It pro-
tects us against arbitrary actions from the government. However, a con-
sensus does not exist as to whether substantive due process should allow 
the judiciary to examine economic regulations. For the most part, the 
federal courts have held that economic regulations do not violate sub-
stantive due process under the federal constitution. However, state 
courts have not always agreed with the federal courts' interpretation of 
substantive due process. 
State courts feel that they have several justifications for using sub-
stantive due process to examine state-passed economic regulations. Be-
cause states do not always follow the interpretation of substantive due 
process developed by the United States Supreme Court, inconsistent re-
sults occur in cases involving similar facts. One state may uphold an 
economic regulation, while a neighboring state may strike it down. 
119. Abrahamson, supra note 21, at 970. Abrahamson refers to a "new federalism" which 
he calls the resurgence of state constitutional law as a font for individual rights. See supra notes 
30-37 and accompanying text. 
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Consequences of these inconsistent results are widespread but ex-
pected in a society which has adopted a dual sovereignty concept. If we 
want to maintain the notion of independent states with substantially 
independent constitutions, then we must accept that inconsistent out-
comes in cases involving substantive due process challenges are likely to 
occur. While one standard of substantive due process review is not nec-
essary or even desirable under our federalist system, large inconsisten-
cies and flat contradictions arising from varying standards make it diffi-
cult to determine the requirements of due process. 
Keith L. Hendricks 
